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Non-normal operating conditions
Interest is concentrated in. this paper on non-normal operating conditions
which can develop into accidents with serious consequences for the plant in
the form of equipment damage but where the operating personnel have the
possibility for taking corrective action.
Typically this implies that
(a) changes in the plant's primary process have occurred due either to
technical failures or to improper maneuvers which directly influence the con-
trol of large amounts of energy but where there exists sufficient delay between
the detection of these changes by the operator and their ultimate consequence
because of integration effects in a disturbed energy balance or time lag in a
mass or information flow,
or that
 (b) plant conditions have been affected, for example, by a disturbance in an
auxiliary system without a direct and immediate consequence for the primary
process.
In order to give structure to the following discussion, the diagnosis task is
Split into the various phases listed below.  In any given situation, however,
some of these might well be omitted or inter-changed.
(1) detection of a change which in the operator's judgement may develop
into an event chain.
(2)  identification of both the ultimate level of risk to which the situation can
lead as well as the current proximity to that level (in time or in terms of the
probable chain of events) - "what can go wrong and when?"; i.e., a prediction
of the cause-consequence pattern.
(3) identification of the control parameters) which when adjusted will
minimize the level of risk.
(4) correcting adjustments
 (5) localisation of the primary cause "where is the failure?".
 (6) repair
In general, it will be noted that considerable importance is attached in the
discussion to ways & means of maximizing the gain in operator experience
from the diagnostic tasks he is confronted with and supporting his utilization
of this experience under subsequent diagnosis.
Detection of non-normal conditions
In modern process plant, hazardous changes in operating conditions are-
usually detected by the control system's alarming function.  The alarm system
i,,3 the tool employed to detect those non-normal states which can be defined
with reasonable confidence beforehand by the control designer and can be ex-
pressed in terms of an alarm limit.
At the same time, there are indications 'that an operator often can detect an
abnormal situation before it has developed to the point where one or another
alarm limit is exceeded.  This pre-alarm detection is important because
(1) it can extend significantly the time available to -the operator for correc-
tion.
(2) it can make use of the operator s perception of the specific situation - a
situation which the system designer may not have been able to predict and
therefore is not covered by the alarm system.
It is possible that pre-alarm detection can' be enhanced by presenting de-
viations in data - which incidentally do not have to be restricted to measure-
ments of the process' physical variables - from fixed or experience-based nor-
mal values.  This can be done in a simple way; for example, by resorting to the
use of variations in light intensity on a CRT screen, a method which also per-
mits viewing a large amount of data at the same time and which therefore can
lead to a reasonable easy detection.
After repair and modification periods it is hot improbable that a process
plant will be left in a unrecognized state which is not guarded against by the
norm al protective system.  Operations personnel should therefore be espe-
cially alert after these periods in order to detect such failures and assure that
the start-up operation proceeds normally.
Alarm systems usually detect either the deviation of process variables from
their full-load values or the exceeding of limits by these variables and there-
fore can be ineffective during a start-up.  The operator can be aided by having
these limits automatically altered concurrently with the changes in operating
conditions during the start-up.  One could also let the alarm system monitor
the inter-variable behavior for those parameters directly related to energy and
mass balances.
In addition, the operator can be helped in attaining a good overall picture of
plant conditions and generating for himself a solid notion of what "normal"
is.
Advanced display techniques offer rich possibilities for achieving this ob-
jective.
For example, the computer could store infor-
mation on the past behavior of all signals from
which it would be possible the instrumentation
system to define an area of experience-based
normality. Allowable tolerances would depend on
such things as the variations in individual op-
erator behaviour.
Since pre-alarm detection amounts actually to
a kind of "screening" of the entire plant, one
could imagine as a supplement to the normal
alarm system a form for simultaneous dynamic
display of relevant process data formatted so as
to facilitate the detection of deviations from normal and, at the same time,
enhance the operators use of his pattern-recognition faculties to ai in an
identification of the deviation. An illustration from Coekin (1970) gives such
an example.
In order to obtain more detailed information, sev-
eral variables can be shown simultaneously in a
way which utilizes the feeling of inherent instability
in certain figures from everyday life. See the exam-
ples for the display of water level and maximum
power. Formats in which changes are easy to recog-
nize because of their graphical form - such as the
spiral (phase-plane) representation of a servo-
transient (Wohl 1965 for testing Apollo)- also can be
employed. Similar ideas led to the survey display for
a power plant boiler  (see opposite) where the nor-
mal profile is "frozen" and subsequent deviations
become readily apparent in the form of zero-point
shifts.  A suggestion by Bowens (1967) illustrates
the possibilities for detecting changes in large data
sets.
Early detection of a change in a variable and its
ultimate effects due to integration build-ups can be
aided by a display of the parameter vs. time (trend
curve) on a recorder or CRT.  The opposite page il-
lustrates possible ways for direct graphic represen-
tation of rate-of-change information within the for-
matting of the parameter itself.  This could be used
as a supplement for the normal trend displays.  A
predictive display which extends a recorder curve a
little way into the future can have a similar effect.


"What can go wrong and when" Identification of ultimate risk level and
its imminence
The situation is complicated by the fact that the plant's state is deter-
mined both by the plant itself and the automatic control system so that the
various control loops can make it difficult for the operator to identify the
situation simply by observing plant behaviour.
Possibilities for an operator action will
depend on the delay associated with an
incident's propagation through the plant
or on integration effects from an energy
balance disturbance which eventually
can result in a dangerous trend in the
form of high temperature, pressure, etc.
or on the delay associated with a mass
or information flow.  This phase of the
diagnosis is therefore a rough evaluation
of both the time available as well as the
cause-consequence chain between the
incident and possible. consequences
with significant energy release, plant
damage, etc.  In a well-protected plant
with many alarm inputs, an overview of
the alarm grouping with respect to pri-
mary process or auxiliary system will
often permit such a quick and direct
first diagnosis.  This is especially true for
the conventional alarm displays where
plant state is characterized by a pattern
of alarms.  On the other hand, a
chronological alarm listing in text form
tends to worsen this overview by mixing
alarms together.  As an aid during this
initial phase (see opposite) is suggested a
graphic presentation which groups
alarms according to-the plants func-
tional structure.  Similarly, another pos-
sibility (see margin) describes a geo-
graphic grouping.  These two displays
are condemned mainly with this first
rough evaluation by the operator and
therefore concentrate more on the relation between alarms and plant than
on an identification of individual alarms.  However, this is also possible
through the use, in the one case, of abbreviations and, in the other, of sym-
bols (a la traffic signs).
In the long run, a sorting out of alarms according to their location in the
plant could be carried out in the computer by means of an analysis of the
alarms and process data.  It is considerably simpler to identify the non-
normal plant sections than it is to establish primary cause because of the
enormous number of  'possibilities for single and combination failures which
must be taken into account.
Identification of the control parameter and correction
The next phase is an identification of
the control parameter which can be ad-
justed to avoid possible consequences at
high energy levels in the form of damage
or a drastic intervention by the auto-
matic protection system.  It is still not
necessary to identify the primary cause.
The task is to delay or stop the incident's
propagation, for example, by re-
establishing temporarily the disturbed
balance so that any integration effects in
the form of increasing temperature or
pressure caused by the unbalance are
restrained before d dangerous level is
reached.  An increasing temperature can
be brought under control by reducing
the input energy regardless of whether
the increase is due to energy transfer,
reduced loading or ineffective cooling.  In
this connection, there is a need for
summary information the flow system in
question with a display of the conditions
in the input and output lines plus status
of the associated controls. Appropriate
formats probably are flow diagrams or
mimic schema with display of all control
organs and their positions.  A simple
display of this type is illustrated for the
DR 2 reactor system discussed in Ras-
mussen (1974), the process data dis-
played here should be converted to vari-
ables which balance directly - in the
form of indications of both inlet and outlet
flow rates as well as the coolant level be-
tween this task and continuing his diagno-
sis.
In some cases, support in the form of pre-
dictive displays could be considered.  These
have already been employed, for example, in
reactor plants to predict Xenon poisoning.
To monitor any corrective action, a trend
display or one of the previously mentioned
suggestions for indicating a parameter's
rate-of-change can be advantageous in per-
mitting an early evaluation of a transient's
final level.
Locating the primary cause
After the plant is brought to a provisional
yet safe condition, the primary cause must be located and corrected.  In this
connection, it is important to remember that the more complicated failure
situations often can be a combination of
several primary causes including errors
committed during repair or inspection
tasks. It is therefore doubtful that an ex-
tensive automatic analysis will be appro-
priate.  If it is to be more or less complete,
its implementation will be expensive and its
results often too conservative; if it is not,
then the analysis can be misleading or, at
best, trivial.
A better basis for assistance would be to
support the operator's initiative and use of
his own procedures.
The task is to encircle and find the geo-
graphical location of the failure; i.e., where
the component is physically.  Some analo-
gies derived from an earlier investigation of
trouble-shooting behaviour in a group re-
pairing electronic instruments (Rasmussen
and Jensen (1973) can be relevant here as
a starting point.
The first rough localization resembles the
"functional search" with which electronic trouble-shooting begins.  The fail-
ure is traced to the subsystem with the defective function
Subsequent trouble-shooting can take place in basically different ways.
One employs a general search procedure which takes place along the main
flow paths through the sub-system. At relevant points along the way simple
good/bad -judgements are made to establish whether the status is normal.
This amounts to a topological search an . d requires as support a diagram
(road map) of the system with information on normal values. In practice,
 the conditions a path are not directly measurable but must be derived
from secondary" information in the control room. In a similar manner, a dia-
gram from the "drawing-file" often must be used both as the road map and
as a support for deriving actual plant conditions from the available data.
In this search procedure, the variables must be related to details in the
process state and component functioning along flow path instead of to the
flow balance in the system. Therefore diagrams such as the one suggested in
the margin can be useful.
Often the operator will have a hypothesis about -the cause of failure
based, perhaps on experience. In these cases, the search procedure can take
on another form.  A guess is made about the failure, and, using his knowl-
edge of the plant's anatomy and functioning, the operator evaluates the
likely consequences of the hypothesized failure including their effects on the
displayed information in the control room.  Thereafter the hypothesis may
be tested by comparison with the actual indications.
Thus it is relevant in this connection to talk about support in the gener-
ating and testing of hypotheses.
The operator's formulation of hypotheses can be stimulated by supporting
his reasoning with overall functional diagrams showing the connections
between systems regardless of whether they relate to air, water, power, in-
strumentation, etc.  Normally these are only available separately This need
was recognized in an earlier study which suggested documentation in a
flexible form with the assistance of a computer supplied with the informa-
tion and programs required, for example, to display
- process data under various characteristic situations
- actual connections, for example, geographical, between various plant
subsystems, common supplies, common detector locations, common drain
systems, etc.
Instead of supporting hypothesis generation through an automatic diag-
nosis facility, it would be preferable to provide the operator with more suit-
able search procedures. Built-in test facilities should be considered together
with assistance in the operator's choice of test-strategy; for example, in the
form of test-matrices as suggested by Wohl, (1965) for checkout of the Apollo
system.
Test of a hypothesis can be supported by ensuring that the operator has
access to a collective set of relevant data, structured according to sub-
system and function so that he is given direct assistance in remembering
the causal relationships within the system.
The operator is likely to consider first the most probable hypotheses
which furthermore might be based on just a few typical indications.  From a
safety point-of-view, it is more desirable of course to investigate first the
riskier situations even though their occurrence is much less likely.  Instead
of forcing this consideration on the operator, for example, through a conser-
vative automatic diagnosis facility, it would be better to help him through a
quick t est of these most likely hypotheses and, at the same time, avoid the
typical human tendency to "see only what one wishes to see", confirmed by a
few typical observations.
These "most likely" hypotheses will be those the operator has experienced
earlier.  It may become realistic to collect system -based "experience" by
giving the operator the possibility for "freezing" abnormal data sets in a
store.  After a successful diagnosis the corresponding data set can be la-
beled by writing in the primary cause.,These sets can be used later for quick
tests of a hypothesis.  Or should there be placed more emphasis on built-in
test facilities?
In a discussion of the trouble-shooting procedure, it is important to con-
sider the difficulties which can arise if the plant is shut-down.  These diffi-
culties relate to the need for "freezing" process data describing the abnormal
pre-shut-down state and possible problems with carrying out realistic func-
tional tests during shut-down.
Conclusions
As stated earlier, these speculations serve only as a rough outline to il-
lustrate different aspects of the diagnostic task ,and to connect an existing
set of ideas and suggestions for displays with the various requirements as-
sociated with these phases.
However, a more detailed and realistic definition of the various diagnostic
phases based on control room studies is necessary as well as a better for-
mulation of the Situations where the operator actually is confronted with a
diagnostic task.  In parallel with this,, various display ideas can be tested
separately by means of simpler laboratory experiments.
Accordingly, the following is a short summary of the current program:
1. Gathering of case stories in order to characterize and evaluate the op-
erator's ]ob and work situation.
2. Studies in the control room in order to specify the task phases and
procedures employed.
3. Evaluation of appropriate procedures and the possibilities for sup-
porting them through an integrated data processing and display system.
4. Testing of detailed proposals through laboratory experiments.
5. Eventual experiments - preferably with a simulator - using trained op-
erators for testing of the complete system.
In addition, the possibilities for computer collection of process data which
can be used to establish "experience-based" normal/abnormal plant condi-
tions will be studied.
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